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Abstract: With the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe, anti-communism gained new 
momentum. In Poland, it has become a hegemonic discourse that manifests itself in (and 
reproduces itself through) legislation, public history, politics, and education, as well as pop 
culture. However, the discursive dominance of anti-communism has hardly been researched 
systematically. In this article, I aim to apply hegemony analysis, as developed by Martin 
Nonhoff – and based on Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s theory of discourse – to anti-
communism in contemporary Poland. I give an overview of the methodology and discuss 
concrete analytical tools and their possible application and argue that, as a result of an 
antagonistic division of discursive space, communism becomes a “general crime”, an obstacle 
that prevents Polish society from finding “ultimate reconciliation with itself” and reaching its 
(mythical) fullness. 
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With the collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe as well as the narrative of the “end of 
history” and the superiority of capitalism and liberal democracy, anti-communism gained new 
momentum (Žižek 2009; Kapmann, Müller, and Stojaković 2017, 11). Enzo Traverso even 
speaks of “a new wave of anti-communism: a “militant”, fighting anti-communism, all the more 
paradoxical inasmuch as its enemy had ceased to exist” (2016). In Poland, similar to some other 
post-socialist states (cf. Holubec and Mrozik 2018)1, it has become one of the key political 
discourses (Żukowski 2009; Saryusz-Wolska, Stach, and Stoll 2016; Janicka 2016) and may even 
be perceived as a discursive foundation of the Third Republic (Walicki 2013, 199–201).2 The 
anti-communist consensus is shared by all socially relevant forces, including most of the left 
(Mrozik 2014). Polish anti-communism takes different, partly contradictory, forms: from 
opposition to Marxism and classical theorists of communism, to an over-simplified critique of 
the People’s Republic of Poland3, to a general rejection of leftist or even liberal ideas (cf. Mrozik 
2015). It manifests itself in legislation, public history, education, and everyday political life, as 
well as in pop culture. Although its scale is so remarkable, its hegemony so uncontested, and 
its manifestations so diverse, the current discursive dominance of anti-communism has not yet 
been researched systematically.4 
One of the reasons might be that anti-communism is a relatively young research area. As 
historian Bernd Faulenbach claims, its significant historisation only began after the downfall of 
the socialist European states around 1989 (Faulenbach 2017). There are studies that focus 
primarily on specific historical periods in different countries. For example, in Germany, the 
role of anti-communism in Nazi ideology and during the Adenauer era has been relatively well 
explored (Körner 2003; Korte 2009; Creuzberger and Hoffmann 2014). The same can be said 
of the so-called “Red Scare” and the McCarthy era in the US (Murray 1964; Fried 1997; Heale 
1990, 1998; Ceplair 2011; Storrs 2013). But the existing research is limited in time, mainly 
                                               
1 Holubec and Mrozik claim that “[t]he principal cause of  this rise of  anti-communism appears to be the 
failure of  the dominant transformations narratives – such as the ‘catch up with the West’ and the ‘building of  
democracy’ – and the disappointment of  Eastern European societies, especially Polish, Hungarian or Romanian, 
with their elites perceived as reincarnations of  communism” (Holubec and Mrozik 2018, 14). 
2 According to Walicki, the Third Republic of  Poland was born as “an ideological project of  radical right-
wing anti-communism” (Walicki 2013, 200). He points out that Lech Wałęsa did not receive the presidential 
insignia on 22 December 1990 from resigning president Wojciech Jaruzelski, who had not been invited to the 
ceremony, but from Ryszard Kaczorowski, the president of  the London-based government-in-exile. The term 
“Third Republic” (Trzecia Rzeczpospolita), describing Poland after the political-economic changes 1989–1990, 
is not an official one, but it appears in the preamble of  the Polish constitution from 1997. 
3 That is, a critique that does not aim at criticising some aspects of  the People’s Republic of  Poland, but in 
fact is a condemnation of  communism (socialism) en bloc.  
4 This does not mean that some particular aspects have not been studied. For example, the antisemitic topos 
of  “Jewish Communism” (“żydokomuna”) has been researched quite thoroughly, see: Gerrits 1995; Blatman 
1997; Pufelska 2007; Zawadzka 2009, 2012, 2016; Starnawski 2012; Śpiewak 2012; Forecki 2017. 
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focusing on the period between the beginning of the 20th century and the end of the Cold War. 
Therefore, present day anti-communism, not only in Poland, has not adequately been studied.5 
One of the difficulties in research on this topic involves terminological matters and the 
fact that the term “anti-communism” has been intensely politically disputed and even on its 
definition “opinions in the political-scientific discussions (…) differ considerably”, as 
Faulenbach notices (Faulenbach 2011, 1). In this paper I use a broad definition of anti-
communism that allows me to take into account the multitude of its manifestations in 
contemporary Poland. In practice this means that my work is not based on a certain definition 
of “communism” but rather explores how the term is used in political discourses (cf. OSKiLnK 
2013). 
This article proposes to apply hegemony analysis to anti-communist discourse in Poland. 
After giving an overview of the methodology as developed by Martin Nonhoff, I proceed to 
discuss concrete theoretical tools and their possible application, using various examples from 
the period after 1989. These are not selected systematically but rather aim to show the broad 
scope of anti-communism. It should be emphasized that this paper has an introductory 
character and does not claim to give a full overview of neither Nonhoff’s approach, nor Laclau 
and Mouffe’s discourse and hegemony theory. It introduces only those aspects and concepts 
which are relevant for the analysis of the hegemony of anti-communism and aims at starting 
a debate, rather than giving definitive answers. Therefore, some aspects that are basic in 
hegemony theory, such as the relationship between discourse and subject, are not discussed in 
this article.  
 
Hegemony analysis as political discourse analysis 
The hegemony analysis applied in this article is a method used for the analysis of political 
discourses, developed by political scientist and professor of political theory at the University 
of Bremen, Martin Nonhoff (2006). His approach is based on Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe’s theory of discourse as introduced in their collective work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (2014 [1985]), as well as its further development by Laclau 
(Nonhoff 2006, 18). Nonhoff aims at closing its “methodology gap” by making their theory 
                                               
5 In the Polish context, anti-communism among right-wing parties and political groups during the period 
1989–2000 has been analysed in detail by Artur Lipiński (2005). I would also like to point out the work of  the 
Center for Cultural and Literary Studies of  Communism at the Institute of  Literary Research at the Polish 
Academy of  Sciences, founded 2011, and its book series “Communism. Ideas – Discourses – Practices” 
(“Komunizm: Idee – Dyskursy – Praktyki”), which – going against the dominant narratives about communism 
– is unique in the Polish academic landscape. One can also observe a rising interest in anti-communism in 
journalistic texts: see, for example: two issues of  the quarterly “Bez Dogmatu” (79/2009 and 116/2018) with 
a series of  articles on anti-communism in Poland after 1989: Wielgosz 2017, Herer 2017. 
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more suitable for discourse analysis (Nonhoff 2008, 300; Nonhoff 2019, 64).6 He himself uses 
it to analyse the discourse of the “social market economy” in Germany during the 1940s and 
1950s. However, in doing so, he is less concerned with the specifics of how and why the 
hegemony of the “social market economy” has been established, but instead focuses on the 
more general question of “how hegemony is being exercised, in which structures and 
mechanisms it is grounded, and which factors are characteristic of its success” (Nonhoff 2006, 
10).  
 Nonhoff‘s hegemony analysis focuses on political discourses, understood as discourses 
in which a (specific) universal is being disputed in a conflictual manner (Nonhoff 2006, 19). Its 
approach – following Laclau and Mouffe – does not distinguish between discursive and non-
discursive practices and perceives discourse as prior to the distinction between linguistic and 
extra-linguistic, since it includes both linguistic and non-linguistic elements. As Laclau and 
Mouffe emphasize: “[B]y discourse we do not mean a combination of speech and writing, but 
rather that speech and writing are themselves but internal components of discursive totalities” 
(Laclau and Mouffe 1987, 82). They define discourse as “the structured totality resulting from 
the articulatory practice” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014, 91), i.e. from the practice of differentiation 
between elements and, as a result, the production of meaning and its partial and temporary 
fixation through privileged discursive points. Following Saussurean linguistics (Saussure 1959), 
a term like “communism” gains its meaning only in the process of differentiating it from, and 
in relation to, other terms such as “capitalism”, “social democracy”, and so on (cf. Torfing 
1999, 87). Meaning is not fixed permanently and – to anticipate the subsequent reflections on 
hegemony – “[t]o contend that there exists such a given meaning must be considered 
a hegemonic move in itself” (Nonhoff 2005, 13).  
Hegemony is the second key notion which Nonhoff adopts from Laclau and Mouffe. 
The authors of Hegemony and Socialist Strategy in turn refer to Antonio Gramsci, who 
distinguishes between domination on the one hand and “intellectual and moral leadership“ on 
the other (Gramsci 1999, 212). To him, rather than open coercion, hegemony is based on a kind 
of political agreement and consensus. However, this does not mean that it is purely consensual 
(cf. Opratko 2012, 63), since Gramsci perceives it as a “combination of force and consent, 
which balance each other reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent” 
(Gramsci 1999, 248). 
Laclau and Mouffe understand hegemony as a process or a relation “by which a certain 
particular content overflows its own particularity and becomes the incarnation of the absent 
                                               
6 There are a number of  analyses inspired by Laclau and Mouffe’s theory and the so-called Essex School, e.g. 
of  populism and nationalism, environmental movements, political identities, European integration and security 
policy, etc. See: Howarth, Norval and Stavrakakis 2000; Howarth and Torfing 2005. 
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fullness of society” (Laclau 1995, 89) or “the name of an utterly incommensurable universality” 
(Laclau 2006, 648). The former illustrates this point as follows: 
Let us suppose a situation of generalized social disorder: in such a situation “order” 
becomes the name of an absent fullness, and if that fullness is constitutively 
unachievable it cannot have any content of its own, any form of self-representation. 
“Order” becomes thus autonomous vis-à-vis any particular order as far as it is the name 
of an absent fullness that no concrete social order can achieve (…). That fullness is 
present, however, as that which is absent and needs as a result to be represented in some 
way. Now, its means of representation will be constitutively inadequate, for they can 
only be particular contents which assume, in certain circumstances, a function or 
representation of the impossible universality of the community (Laclau 1995, 89). 
In their definition of hegemony Laclau and Mouffe draw on (Lacan’s) psychoanalysis and the 
experience of lack.7 They explain what, from the psychoanalytical point of view, is “the moment 
of the mythical fullness for which we search in vain: the restoration of the mother/child unity 
(…) [is], in political terms, the fully reconciled society” (Laclau 2005a, 119). This (purely 
mythical) social fullness is to be achieved only through hegemony (Laclau 2005a, 119): 
[V]arious political forces can compete in their efforts to present their particular 
objectives as those which carry out the filling of that lack. To hegemonize something is 
exactly to carry out this filling function (Laclau 1996, 44). 
In a similar sense, Simon Critchley speaks of “hegemonization” as “actions that attempt to fix 
the meaning of social relations” (Critchley 2004, 113). Following Gramsci, Laclau and Mouffe, 
Nonhoff defines hegemony not as the predominance of particular individuals or groups but as 
“the predominance of a certain constellation of socially shared meaning” (Nonhoff 2006, 11). 
In other words, hegemony is about generating social naturalness, universal validity or normality 
(40).  
 
                                               
7 Lacan’s psychoanalysis plays an important role in hegemony and discourse theory but further elaboration 
on it would exceed the scope of  this paper. Laclau’s empty signifier would, for example, correspond with Lacan’s 
master signifier, the impossibility of  society – with the impossibility of  the sexual relation, and so on (Glynos 
and Stavrakakis 2004). Hegemonic logic is, as Laclau claims, identical to the logic of  the objet petit a (Laclau 2005a, 
115–116).  
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Hegemonic demands and discursive relations  
Nonhoff starts his analysis of hegemony by looking at the smallest part of discourse, which he, 
following Laclau, calls “demand” (Laclau 2005a, 73). He identifies three types of hegemonic 
demands (Nonhoff 2008, 39), all of which can be retraced in anti-communist discourse. Firstly, 
there are cumulative demands, which substantiate a particular aspect of the universal and can 
always be complemented by additional cumulative demands. For example, changing street 
names in order to “overcome” the communist past is a very specific demand which can easily 
be supplemented by additional demands, such as banning communist symbols or tearing down 
monuments. Secondly, there are subsuming demands, which claim that if they are met, then so too 
will other hegemonic demands. For example, a demand to defend the Polish nation against the 
onslaught of cultural Marxism, also implies that a successful defence would save Christianity 
and “traditional family values” from the disintegrating influences of “gender ideology”, etc. In 
this case, a nationalist anti-communist demand goes hand in hand with a religious and 
patriarchal one. Thirdly, there are encompassing demands, the fulfilment of which constitutes 
a sufficient condition for the rectification of the lack of the universal. An example would be 
the famous sentence of Poland's first post-communist prime minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
(1989): “We draw a thick line under the past”, implying that communism is over once and for 
all and that society can finally return to normality. 
According to Nonhoff, the struggle for hegemony can be divided into three different but 
overlapping steps (Nonhoff 2006, 140–141). The first step contains hegemonic articulations, 
attempting to expand their influence in the field of competing discourses. In the second step, 
these articulations constitute a hegemonic project, which can be described as political discourse 
with a pivotal promise striving towards hegemony. Finally, in the third step we can speak of an 
established hegemony; if “a demand [is] in fact across a longer period of time [it will] be 
disseminated as the common will of the politico-societal forces” (Nonhoff 2005). However, it 
should be mentioned that the establishment of this ‘common will’ does not mean that there 
are no deviating opinions. Hegemony is about predominance, not total domination and can 
therefore never be total. Its reach regarding content, space and time is always limited (Nonhoff 
2006, 147). 
 Hegemony analysis focuses on relations between discursive elements; Nonhoff 
distinguishes five types of them (Nonhoff 2008, 307). Difference (“x is different from y”) is the 
basic relation between all discursive elements, and can be retraced in all other discursive 
relations. In a relation of equivalence (“x is different from y, but in relation to a both go hand in 
hand”), two elements are articulated as different from each other, but equivalent with regard 
to a third one. An example for this relation would be a typical argument stemming from the 
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theory of totalitarianism, as present in Polish legislation after 1989.8 It runs as follows: 
Communism may differ from fascism, but both are totalitarian systems, which are responsible 
for the death of millions of people. Moving on, the relation of contrariness (“x is different from 
y, and in relation to a it is blocked by y”) explicitly articulates the impossibility of a connection 
between two elements and puts them in opposition to each other (but not in every regard). The 
common claim in neoliberal discourse comes to mind, which contrasts the alleged mentality of 
a “homo sovieticus” with an “entrepreneurial spirit” and which states that the former is 
incompatible with the free market (cf. Żukowski 2012; Buchowski 2013). Even stronger is the 
relation of super-difference (“x is different from y, and it has nothing at all to do with y”), which 
separates “discursive arenas” and emphasizes the difference between two discursive elements 
by articulating that they are not only different from each other, but that there is no connection 
between them whatsoever, not even in a negative sense. A characteristic example for this 
relation is the infamous quote by ex-Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski: 
The previous government implemented a left-wing concept, as if the world had to move 
using a Marxist model in only one direction: towards a mixture of cultures and races, 
a world of cyclists and vegetarians, who only use renewable energy sources and 
combat all forms of religion. This has nothing in common with traditional Polish values 
(Waszczykowski 2016). 
And finally, in a relation of representation (“x stands for y”), one element embodies a second one:  
When we hear Gazeta Wyborcza, we think of Trybuna Ludu. When we hear PO, we 
think of PZPR. And when we see a high-ranking representative of the government, the 
first thing that comes to our mind is “Down with Communism!” (Winnicki 2012).9 
Nonhoff’s five discursive relations could be expanded by a sixth one: identification (“x is 
identical to y with regard to a”). This relation is similar to equivalence but with a different 
emphasis. While in the relation of equivalence, two elements are different in general, but 
equivalent with regard to a third one, in the relation of identification, two elements are 
                                               
8 According to article 13 of  the Polish Constitution from 1997, “[p]olitical parties and other organizations 
whose programmes are based upon totalitarian methods and the modes of  activity of  nazism, fascism and 
communism, as well as those whose programmes or activities sanction racial or national hatred, the application 
of  violence for the purpose of  obtaining power or to influence the State policy, or provide for the secrecy of  
their own structure or membership, shall be prohibited”.  
9 Gazeta Wyborcza is a Polish liberal newspaper; Trybuna Ludu was from 1948 to 1990 the official newspaper 
of  the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR); PO/Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) is a liberal-
conservative political party in Poland. Robert Winnicki, a far-right politician, means here the Second Cabinet of  
Donald Tusk – a coalition government of  the PO and the agrarian, conservative Polish People's Party (PSL).  
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perceived as basically the same, and different only in marginal aspects. The following quote by 
right-wing politician Janusz Korwin-Mikke may serve as an example. 
We surely have to deal with a new form of communism, only in a new disguise. As Coco 
Chanel used to say: “New and old are the same, only wrapped differently”. This holds 
true for the Law and Justice party as well. They are communists in a new wrapper with 
a cross on top of it (Korwin-Mikke 2018). 
The discursive relations described above can function as modes of arranging discursive 
elements into coherent strategemes, which in turn constitute a hegemonic strategy. 
 
Hegemonic strategy and its core strategemes  
Every hegemonic strategy is composed of a number of hegemonic strategemes. Nonhoff 
identifies nine such strategemes, three of which he calls “core strategemes”, because they are 
sufficient to grasp a hegemonic strategy (Nonhoff 2006, 212–221).10 Although they are always 
intertwined in practice, their separate examination can be useful for analytical purposes. After 
a more detailed examination of these core strategemes, I proceed to discuss the question of 
how to apply the hegemony analysis as developed by Nonhoff to anti-communist discourse. 
(I) Articulation of equivalences between different demands made with regard to the 
universal  
In the logic of equivalence, different demands are articulated as equivalent so that a variety of 
groups and individuals can perceive them as their own. The exemplary structure of such 
a demand runs as follows: “Your demand is actually the same as ours, so if our demand is 
fulfilled, so will yours be“ (Nonhoff 2006, 214). This articulation of equivalences between 
different demands leads to the formation of chains of equivalence: “v, w, x, y and z are all 
different from each other, but equivalent with regard to a”. Such a chain of equivalence forms 
itself in opposition to a “constitutive outside”.11 This means that the equivalent demands are 
                                               
10 For additional strategemes identified by Nonhoff, which aim to expand the range of  hegemony, see 
Nonhoff  2006, 211–221.  
11 Laclau defines a “constiutive outside” as “an ‘outside’ which blocks the identity of  the ‘inside’ (and is, 
nonetheless, the prerequisite for its constitution at the same time)” (Laclau 1990, 17). As Torfing argues, “the 
constitutive outside of  a discourse A, which is discursively constructed by the expansion of  a chain of  
equivalence, is neither B nor non-A, but anti-A” (Torfing 1999, 125). 
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not united by “something positive (…), but something negative: their opposition to a common 
enemy” (Laclau 1996, 40–41).  
(II) Antagonistic division of discursive space  
In the logic of difference, all demands that do not correspond with the central hegemonic 
demand are also discursively knotted together in a chain of equivalence. The construction of 
such an opposing chain is an important part of every hegemonic practice. In the end, since 
“[a]ntagonism12 does not admit tertium quid” (Laclau 2014 [1985], 115), we reach two 
antagonistic camps or opposing blocks of demands. These are made up of “the elements of 
lack, lethargy, and resistance on the one hand (…) and the demand to overcome these negative 
forces on the other (…)” (Nonhoff 2005). One’s own essential demand is contrasted with an 
antagonistic one, which is perceived and represented as the “core of all evil” (Nonhoff 2006, 
220). However, these chains of equivalence are never set permanently, since there is a constant 
struggle for the creation of differences and new chains of equivalence. 
(III) Representation 
Hegemonies are usually centred on a specific discursive element which is supposed to represent 
the universal. Since the universal, for example the common good or an equivalent notion 
(freedom, wealth), cannot directly actualize itself in a discourse, it has to be symbolized by 
a specific element, which Laclau calls an “empty signifier” (Laclau 1996, 34–46).13 It is the 
central demand in which all particular demands are represented. As Laclau suggests, “[t]he 
presence of empty signifiers (…) is the very condition of hegemony” (43). He states that: 
representation is only possible if a particular demand, without entirely abandoning its 
own particularity, starts also functioning as a signifier representing the chain as a totality 
(in the same way as gold, without ceasing to be a particular commodity, transforms its 
                                               
12 The term antagonism is understood by Laclau and Mouffe (2014 [1985]) differently than in the Marxist 
tradition (Nonhoff  2014, 31). It is neither a “real opposition” (A–non A) nor a “logical contradiction” (A–B), 
since these are objective relations and the objects (real or conceptual) have full identities: “But in the case of  
antagonism, we are confronted with a different situation: the presence of  the ‘Other’ prevents me from being 
totally myself. The relation arises not from full totalities, but from the impossibility of  their constitution. (…) 
[A]ntagonisms are not internal but external to society; or rather, they constitute the limits of  society, the latter’s 
impossibility of  fully constituting itself ” (Laclau and Mouffe 2014, 111–112, emphasis in original). However, this 
conception of  antagonism (A–anti–A), as formulated in Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, has evolved in their later 
work, especially in Laclau’s New Reflections on the Revolution of  Our Time (1990). For the development of  the 
understanding of  antagonism by Laclau and Mouffe see: Torfing 1999, 120–131 and Nonhoff  2017. 
13 In order to emphasize the process of  one element becoming the incarnation of  the universal, Nonhoff  
suggests speaking of  “emptied” rather than “empty signifiers” (2006, 132). 
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own materiality into the universal representation of value). This process by which 
a particular demand comes to represent an equivalential chain incommensurable with it 
is, of course, what we have called hegemony (Laclau 2005b, 39). 
One of his favourite examples of an empty signifier is the Polish trade union Solidarność, 
whose symbols “[a]t some point, (…) became the symbols of the absent fullness of society” 
(Laclau 2005a, 226): 
The demands of Solidarnosc, for instance, started by being the demands of a particular 
working class group in Gdansk, but as they were formulated in an oppressed society, 
where many social demands were frustrated, they became the signifiers of the popular 
camp in a new dichotomic discourse (Laclau 2005b, 39). 
It is important to note that such an understanding of Solidarność is only possible from today’s 
dominant perspective and is a result of a struggle for its hegemonisation. During the 1980s, the 
meaning of the movement was still not determined and potentially open to other 
interpretations. In this sense, Solidarność retroactively became a signifier of the struggle against 
communism only after 1989.14 
Communism as a signifier of exclusion 
How can we transfer concepts from hegemony and discourse theory to the analysis of anti-
communist discourse in contemporary Poland? As a result of the antagonistic division of 
discursive space, it is possible to discern two chains of equivalence. On one side there is 
everything which contributes to the overcoming of communism (“everything which resolves 
the lack of the universal”), and on the other exists everything which renders the overcoming 
of communism impossible (“everything which prevents the successful removal of the lack”) 
(Nonhoff 2006, 2016). As Laclau and Mouffe argue, in each discourse one specific logic – 
either logic of equivalence or logic of difference – predominates, which affects the division of 
discursive space: “[T]he logic of equivalence is a logic of the simplification of political space, 
while the logic of difference is a logic of its expansion and increasing complexity.” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2014, 117). When the former preponderates, the discursive space is divided into two 
clearly opposed camps (“friend” vs. “enemy”), while in the latter such dichotomisation is not 
                                               
14 Against the mainstream interpretation of  Solidarność goes, for example, Jan Sowa, for whom at least the 
so-called first Solidarność from 1980 was not an anti-communist movement, but on the contrary, “an event par 
excellence communist” (Sowa 2015, 177). 
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possible since constructing “an enemy” is much more difficult (cf. Norval 2000, 221).15 Anti-
communism is thus an example of a discourse where the logic of equivalence is predominant: 
As the Razem example shows (see below), it is not possible to take a middle ground – it is 
necessary to position oneself as anti-communist to be taken seriously in public discourse. Any 
ambiguous stance is immediately identified as the communist “enemy”.  
This antagonistic division of discursive space takes on different forms. In mainstream 
narratives regarding the People’s Republic of Poland, the division runs between the Polish 
nation (or society) and the communist regime. Both are perceived as monolithic blocks: the 
united, heroic, Catholic nation on the one side, and an external enemy, oppression from 
outside, the embodiment of evil on the other (cf. Żukowski 2009, 5; Chmielewska 2012, 18–
20). As a result of this narrative, the history of the People’s Republic of Poland is presented 
only as a curio, a short disturbance of the natural development of Polish society (Chmielewska 
2012, 31). For the period after 1989, this division has been replaced by the antagonism between 
a Post-Solidarność and a Post-Communist camp, which functioned in a very similar way and 
lasted until 2015, when not a single left-wing party (including the post-socialist Democratic 
Left Alliance) was elected into parliament. Since then, the main parties within the (former) 
post-Solidarność camp have accused each other of being communist.16 
Nevertheless, the central promise of these – seemingly opposing – anti-communist 
discourses stays the same: Polish society will not reach harmony or fullness unless communism, 
“the core of all evil”, is overcome. Communism, as a “general crime”, is an obstacle that 
prevents Polish society “from coinciding with itself, from reaching its own fullness” (Laclau 
2000, 142).17 The promise to overcome communism takes on different forms, depending on 
who articulates it. It can mean the elimination of some imaginary residue of the People’s 
                                               
15 In order to illustrate this point, Glynos and Howarth refer to struggles of  national liberation against colonial 
occupants. Here, both logics are operative: the logic of  equivalence frames this struggle as one of  the oppressed 
colonial subjects vs. oppressive colonial regime (thus levelling the class, gender and other differences among the 
oppressed), while the logic of  difference “draws on other discourses in attempt to break down these chains of  
equivalence (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 144–145), applying a “divide and rule” strategy. Both logics are not 
“mutually exclusive”: they interact with each other and neither can dominate completely (cf. also Torfing 1999, 
125–128; Howarth and Stavrakakis 2000, 12). 
16 To point out one of  many examples: On December 27th, 2017, then Interior Minister Mariusz Błaszczak 
announced that communism in Poland had ended only one week ago (once President Duda had signed new law 
on the Supreme Court and the National Council of  the Judiciary). The leader of  the oppositional Civic Platform 
Grzegorz Schetyna commented on Twitter: "Communism is coming back to Poland and will not end until Law 
and Justice has fallen into political non-existence" (Schetyna 2017). 
17 The phrase “general crime” refers to Karl Marx, who describes the hegemonic operation in which 
a particular class becomes a representative of  the whole society. In order to succeed, “all the defects of  society 
must conversely be concentrated in another class, a particular estate must be the general stumbling-block, the 
incorporation of  the general limitation, a particular social sphere must be looked upon as the notorious crime of  
the whole of  society, so that liberation from that sphere appears as general self-liberation. For one estate to be 
par excellence the estate of  liberation, another estate must conversely be the obvious estate of  oppression” (Marx 
2010 [1843], 185, emphasis in original;). Cf. Laclau 2000. 
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Republic of Poland, the struggle against alleged new forms of communism (such as “cultural 
Marxism”, “gender ideology”, or the European Union) or, last but not least, opposition against 
the current government of the Law and Justice party. Since these demands can never 
completely be fulfilled, the hegemony of anti-communism can perpetuate itself: 
[T]he hegemonic operation is only possible insofar as it never succeeds in achieving 
what it attempts (…). For if such a total suture was possible, it would mean that the 
universal would have found its own undisputed body, an no hegemonic variation would 
any longer be possible (Laclau 2000, 142).  
Can communism function as an empty signifier in this hegemony? Nonhoff would say no, 
because according to him, an empty signifier has to be “positively” loaded, in order to “render 
the universal symbolically accessible” (2006, 129). But other scholars, such as Philipp Sarasin 
(2001), Philip Bedall (2014), and Yannis Stavrakakis distinguish between “positive” and 
“negative” empty signifiers.18 As the latter states:  
The signifier of exclusion (…) is also an empty signifier, but one that represents the 
opposite of the point de capiton19: pure negativity, what has to be negated and excluded 
in order for reality to signify its limits. Reagan’s characterisation of the USSR as the evil 
empire is a good case in point. Here again a particular signifier is “emptied” from its 
concrete content in order to represent a negative universal (…) (Stavrakakis 1999, 80–
81). 
Communism, as a “negative” empty signifier, provides the over-arching frame for a multitude 
of “positive” empty signifiers, which do not share any positive common content and may vary 
from liberal democracy to the Catholic Polish nation. 
 
                                               
18 Laclau takes into consideration the possibility of  a negative empty signifier as well when he states that ”[t]he 
moment of  the antagonistic clash, which cannot be directly represented, can however be signified – positivised, 
if  you want – through the production of  an empty signifier (or two, rather; one at each side of  the antagonistic 
frontier)” (Laclau 2006, 108). 
19 Lacan’s category of  “point de capiton” is in Laclau and Mouffe’s terminology called a “nodal point”: “Any 
discourse is constituted as an attempt to dominate the field of  discursivity, to arrest the flow of  differences, to 
construct a center. We will call the privileged discursive points of  this partial fixation, nodal points” (Laclau and 
Mouffe 2014, 99, emphasis in original). For similarities and differences between a nodal point and an empty 
signifier see: Howarth 2004, 268–269; Laclau 2004, 322.  
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Anti-communist fantasy and its dual character  
Anti-communism, similar to other political discourses, aims “to eliminate anxiety and loss, to 
defeat dislocation, in order to achieve a state of fullness (…)” (Stavrakakis 1999, 82). However, 
it does not only promise “a fullness-to-come once a named or implied obstacle [here: 
communism, M.G.] is overcome”, but it also “foretells of disaster if the obstacle proves 
insurmountable” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 147). Stavrakakis calls these two dimensions of 
(hegemonic) discourse the “dual character of fantasy”, its “beatific and (…) horrific dimension” 
(1999, 52).20 Both aspects “are inseparable and mutually constitutive” (Glynos 2001, 88). It is 
against this background that one should read the following statement of MP Krystyna 
Pawłowicz of the ruling Law and Justice party: 
Only now, 27 years after 1989, a true revolution against communism and the People’s 
Republic of Poland is taking place. It is a battle over life and death. […] The Law and 
Justice party faces a historic task, and in order to ensure the survival of the country it 
must win this battle (Pawłowicz 2016). 
The battle against communism is also waged by a major part of the Polish left. For them, as 
Agnieszka Mrozik notices: 
the communist project and the people connected to it – especially after the Second 
World War – [are] the proverbial ball and chain or an unpleasant surprise, meaning 
a kind of burden, disgrace, trouble (…). It is like an unpleasant smell, which one cannot 
get rid of, like dirt which sticks like a leech, despite repeated attempts at disinfection 
(Mrozik 2014). 
These attempts at “disinfection” are symptomatic of the way the Polish left deals with the 
communist legacy. For example, the standard reaction of the social democratic party Razem to 
“accusations” of being communist is to create a relation of super-difference. When a journalist 
asked Marcelina Zawisza whether she was a communist, she answered: 
No. If someone has difficulties distinguishing between communism and social 
democracy, they did not pay attention in social sciences at school. The solutions that 
we propose do not stem from communism, but have their roots in Western Europe 
(Zawisza 2017). 
                                               
20 Glynos defines fantasy as “a framing device that subjects use to ‘protect’ themselves from the anxiety 
associated with the idea that there is no ultimate guarantee or law underlying and guiding our social existence” 
(Glynos 2011, 70). 
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The same argumentative structure can be observed in the following statement by the party's 
most prominent figure, Adrian Zandberg: 
You must have seriously defective vision to see in us fans of Jaruzelski. (…) It is enough 
to look at the election programme of Razem to notice that our proposals follow the 
example of Northern Europe (Zandberg 2016). 
It is telling that both Zawisza and Zandberg deny any connection between social democracy 
and communism. In doing so, communism is identified with the political leader of the People’s 
Republic of Poland and implicitly with the East. In this narrative, Polish society, including the 
left, must overcome this burden of Eastern communism in order to become part of Western 
or Northern Europe, respectively. In this line of argumentation we can also identify 
Stavrakakis’ “dual character of fantasy”: the Western welfare state being the beatific promise, 
while its horrific dimension is the threat of Poland becoming a second version of “Putin’s 
Russia”.21 
Using a strategy that denies any connections to communism as a political legitimisation and to 
prevent any kind of penalisation (see ft. 8), Razem reproduces anti-communism and 
consolidates its hegemony. The party’s strategy can be understood as an attempt to defend its 
“membership in the Polish national and social community” (OSKiLnK [Żukowski], 228). As 
Tomasz Żukowski puts it:  
Debates about peoples’ connection to communism aroused and still arouses so many 
emotions, because what is at stake is symbolic power. To stigmatise someone as a 
communist means depriving them of the right to participate in public life (Żukowski 
2009, 4). 
In this sense, anti-communism can be perceived as a typical discourse of exclusion and it is 
worthwhile to see it in conjunction with other discourses, such as (Catholic) nationalism and 
antisemitism. For Elżbieta Janicka, an ethnic-religious and an anti-communist doxa are the 
social-cultural frame in contemporary Poland; “[b]oth paradigms overlap and both are 
potentially—if not structurally—built on antisemitism” (Janicka 2016). Anti-communist 
discourse, at least its right-wing variant, works similar to the fascist one, in which “the 
presupposed organic unity of society is perturbed by the intrusion of a foreign body” (Žižek 
2008, 261). In such discourses “the (class) antagonism inherent in the social structure” (261) is 
                                               
21 These two scenarios – beatific and horrific – are put in a nutshell by Maciej Konieczny, a member of  the 
board of  the Razem party: “The question is: do we want to live in a well-functioning European country or in 
Putin’s Russia?” (Konieczny 2015). 
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externalized, the imaginary harmony is disturbed by an external intruder. This “intruder from 
outside” often takes the form of a (Jewish) communist. Żukowski describes him as follows: 
[A communist] has a thousand faces and turns up in the least expected place. He is 
a ghost from the past and a still dangerous, hidden enemy; a foreign occupier and 
a frustrated, familiar “homo sovieticus”, not pleased with free Poland. He feels great in 
the new reality, makes “connections” and drums up corruption in the highest circles of 
business and politics, and – at the same time – organises demanding strikes and does 
not give a damn about market reforms. On the one hand, he sucks blood from the 
Polish people as the enfranchised nomenklatura, and on the other – damages the 
economy with preposterous, extreme leftist ideas. (…) He is an anti-Semite from March 
‘68, but also an anti-Polish Jew. (...) His only useful characteristic – he is permanently 
foreign (Żukowski 2009, 4). 
Jason Glynos and David Howarth argue that where the logic of equivalence predominates, 
“fantasmatic logics may take the form of a narrative in which an internal obstacle (or “enemy 
within”) is deemed responsible for the blockage of identity, while promising a fullness or 
harmony to come” (Glynos and Howarth 2007, 150, emphasis in original). On the other hand, 
within the logic of difference an external enemy or obstacle is deemed to be a threat to an 
already existing fullness and harmony. However, things are not as simple in this case, because 
in anti-communist discourse, both narratives are merged together: The communist as an 
“enemy within” is in many cases being externalised – marked as a Jew, a western cultural 
Marxist, a Russian Bolshevik, etc. – and in doing so, declared a threat to the anti-communist 
Polish nation. 
Conclusion 
In this article I have selectively applied hegemony analysis to anti-communist discourse in 
contemporary Poland. The whole analytical praxis, as developed by Martin Nonhoff, is 
composed of six steps: 1. preparatory work; 2. selection/design of the discourse corpus; 
3. structure of the analysis; 4. analysis of single texts and their context; 5. analysis beyond the 
single text/on the discourse level; 6. checking the validity of the strategemes (Nonhoff 2008, 
316–318; Nonhoff 2019, 84–99). 
Nevertheless, even without the whole process of analysis, it is possible to recognize the 
benefits, challenges and limitations regarding the application of this methodology to anti-
communist discourse. One important advantage is that it forces us to limit the research 
question, which – in the case of such a complex issue as anti-communism – is necessary. 
Hegemony analysis focuses on the functioning of hegemony (with hegemony understood as 
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the function of discourse (Nonhoff 2008, 300)). It is not suited for the reconstruction of the 
conditions and the genesis of anti-communism, or for the exploration of the motivations of 
anti-communists and their goals22, and does not ask why its hegemony is so successful or what 
are its functions. It rather aims at finding typical mechanisms and structures of anti-communist 
discourse.  
Another methodological benefit of this approach is that – widening the scope of 
discourse analysis – it enables us to focus not only on texts, but also on political actions, social 
interventions, institutions, law-making processes, events and so on, since “every social 
configuration is meaningful” (Laclau and Mouffe 1987, 82, emphasis in original) and “[a]s long 
as every non-linguistic action is meaningful, it is also discursive” (85).23 Thirdly, hegemony 
analysis allows us to perceive anti-communism as a hegemony, meaning as a widely shared 
consensus, thus enabling us to focus our research not only on the “usual suspects” (i.e. 
conservative and right-wing anti-communists), but also on how the discourse is internalised 
and reproduced by leftist groups.  
Moreover, Nonhoff's detailed description of the analytical procedure provides a clear 
structure which helps to operationalise Laclau and Mouffe’s theory. Of course, this application 
cannot be simply mechanical. One should “avoid the twin pitfalls of empiricism and 
theoreticism”, as Howarth and Stavrakakis warn: 
[I]nstead of applying a pre-existing theory on to a set of empirical objects, discourse 
theoretics seek to articulate their concepts in each particular enactment of concrete 
research. The condition for this conception of conducting research is that the concepts 
and logics of the theoretical framework must be sufficiently ‘open’ and flexible enough 
to be adopted, deformed and transformed in the process of application (Howarth and 
Stavrakakis 2000, 5). 
Like every methodological approach, hegemony analysis has its limitations. Due to the strong 
focus on the functioning of hegemony, other important research questions are necessarily 
disregarded. It is for example questionable whether one can sufficiently grasp continuities and 
abrupt changes in the history of anti-communism using hegemony analysis, even though it 
perceives hegemony not as something static, but as a continuous process. The same can be said 
about the reasons for the rise of anti-communism, its socio-economic conditions as well as its 
                                               
22 As Ole Wæver notes, discourse analysis “does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of  the actors, their 
hidden intentions or secret plans. (…) What is often presented as a weakness of  discourse analysis – ‘how do you 
find out if  they really mean it?’, ‘what if  it is only rhetoric?’ – can be turned into a methodological strength, as 
soon as one is scrupulous about sticking to discourse as discourse” (Wæver 2005, 33, emphasis in original). 
23 However, according to Nonhoff, this does not hold true for physical violence, which marks the limit of  
discourse (Nonhoff  2006, 11). This assumption appears questionable, since it is not clear in what regard acts of  
violence differ from other non-linguistic discursive actions. 
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functions. Moreover, hegemony analysis might not be the best approach for a comparison of 
different kinds of anti-communism (e.g. social democratic, liberal, and fascist), which are all 
understood as parts of one all-encompassing hegemony.  
Nevertheless, the sound theoretical framework of hegemony analysis can serve as a good 
introductory step for researching anti-communism in contemporary Poland. In return, 
hegemony analysis, as a problem-driven approach, can also benefit from its application to this 
specific discourse, so that in a best-case scenario both anti-communism research and hegemony 
analysis learn from each other. As Jacob Torfing puts it: “The challenge is to go beyond 
illustrative analysis and conduct discourse analysis in order to produce new, unexpected insights 
and sharpen the theoretical categories and arguments” (Torfing 2000, 26). 
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